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  Compared with other European countries, the Italian labour market stands out for the 
low level of both female participation and fertility. In this paper we focus on the employment 
patterns of Italian mothers around the time of childbirth. Our hypothesis is that the 
difficulties involved in reconciling work and family when there are children are among the 
leading causes of the low female employment rate in Italy. Data from the 2002 Italian Birth 
Sample Survey show that about  20 per cent of mothers who were working before childbirth, 
stop working one and a half years after delivery and that about 14 per cent voluntarily decide 
to resign. The paper analyses the factors that most influence new mothers’ unemployment 
risk after childbirth. 
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1.  Introduction1 
In Europe a crucial policy target is to speed up the trend towards the greater 
participation of women in the labour market. In spite of equal opportunity legislation and 
some positive changes in social norms, large gender gaps are still at work. In the long run, 
the increase of female education will have major positive effects. Meanwhile, we are 
experiencing a postponement both in the school-to-work transition and in the age at which 
women have their first child birth. Most notably in Mediterranean countries, very low 
fertility rates highlight widespread difficulties in reconciling work and family life.  
The birth of a child and the age at which children start school, deeply influence female 
employment patterns. In almost all European countries the employment rate of new mothers 
shows a U-shaped pattern, with a sharp drop in the first three years after childbirth, and a 
gradual return to employment, when the youngest child grows up (Fig. A1). Only in Italy 
does the employment rate continue to decline as the child gets older. Italian mothers who 
find themselves unable to re-enter the labour market, risk definitive exclusion. A similar 
scenario emerges, even with respect to Spain and Greece, where labour market attachment is 
low. 
In this paper we study the employment decisions of Italian mothers in the two years 
after childbirth. Compared with other European countries, the Italian case is particularly 
interesting, because: i) there are broad territorial disparities in female employment rates; ii) 
childcare services and tax benefits are minimal; iii) younger workers are increasingly 
confined to a less protected and low-paid segment of the labour market. Overall, formal and 
informal family networks often substitute social services and effective labour market 
flexibilities.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the applied 
literature about female employment decisions. Section 3 describes the 2002 Italian Birth 
Sample Survey (IBSS) data. In Section 4 we discuss the problem of selection and 
endogeneity. Section 5 studies the determinants of mothers’ probability of not working about 
                                                 
1  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy or Istat. We 
are grateful to Renata Bottazi, Luigi Cannari, Giovanni D’Alessio, Mimma Iemmo, Concetta Rondinelli, Federico 
Signorini and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.   
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18-21 months after childbirth. We then focus on working mothers, examining the decision to 
leave their job after delivery. Section 7 presents some concluding remarks. 
2.  The main determinants of mothers’ working status in the literature 
Work and fertility decisions depend upon a broad set of factors such as social customs, 
households’ composition, labour market flexibility, individual preferences, childcare costs 
and availability. Overall the main distinction in Europe is between the more egalitarian 
“northern and continental” countries, and the “Mediterranean” ones, where a significant 
gender gap is present in all the relevant social and economic variables. In particular, 
Mediterranean European countries report low female participation rates, the lowest level of 
social expenditure for families and children and low fertility rates (Esveldt 2003; Jaumotte 
2003; Boeri et al. 2005).  
Different social customs2 strongly influence the division of caring tasks among 
partners, and therefore the distribution of paid working hours. Especially in Mediterranean 
countries, mothers work longer hours than fathers, combining paid jobs with unpaid duties. 
In those countries, the main determinant of a balanced distribution of childcare duties and 
work between couples is women’s human capital. A higher level of female education is 
associated with higher participation in the labour market and greater work attachment 
(Gutiérrez-Domènech 2005; Jaumotte 2003). Even in Italy employment rates for women 
with tertiary education is in line with the European average levels, except for women with 
more than two children (Eurostat 2005).  
Labour market flexibility and regulation matter. In “northern and continental” 
countries, female part-time employment is appreciated as a way to reconcile work and family 
life, and not of reflecting job segregation and wage discrimination. Contrariwise, the spread 
of fixed term contracts could increase female segregation in low–paid positions. In European 
                                                 
2 In the literature, specific long-term effects on female participation are attributed to religion, social transformations (e.g. 
the spread of contraceptive methods and time saving consumer durables), and technological changes that have reduced 
manual jobs. See Boeri et al. 2005, for a review.  
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Mediterranean countries part-time contracts are not fully attractive for mothers, because of 
large wage and career disparities (Jaumotte 2006). In those countries the positive effect of 
part-time arrangements on mothers participation is lessened by the attitude of private 
employers and the difficulties of returning to full-time jobs. Long or repeated spells of non–
employment or under–employment are likely to cause a major loss in mothers’ human 
capital and future wages. 
Childcare services matter in terms of availability, costs and hours provided per day. A 
reduction in the cost should increase the probability of mothers’ full-time employment 
(Jaumotte 2003). Often public structures offer an insufficient number of hours per day; such 
inefficiency, widespread in Mediterranean countries, could enlarge the negative effects of 
labour market rigidities on female participation (OECD 2007). 
Female participation is also influenced by fiscal policies and childcare subsidies. A 
gender based taxation could be theoretically efficient; taxing the more elastic labour supply 
of married women should lead to a more balanced allocation of duties within the family, 
helping to improve its welfare (Alesina et al. 2007). Actually we are far from such 
theoretical efficiency; many different fiscal deductions and subsidies are used, with large and 
country-specific potential inefficiencies.  
Italy reports some specific tendencies, especially in the Southern regions, and a general 
lack of effective policies.3 The Italian distribution of duties and work between couples is the 
most unbalanced in Europe.4 The gap in women’s education is large and only recently being 
narrowed. The Italian labour market is highly segmented and the large number of fixed-term 
contracts tends to increase female segregation in low–paid positions, provide fewer career 
opportunities and a higher level of job insecurity (Addabbo 2003; Pacelli et al. 2007). For 
young workers it is more and more difficult to enter the stable and protected labour market 
segment. These traits have all contributed to a significant postponement in fertility 
(Rondinelli et al. 2006), followed by a recent partial recovery, but only in the North of Italy.  
                                                 
3 See Del Boca (2008) for a comprehensive survey of Italian policies on households, fertility and female employment.  
4 Monti (2007) shows that in many countries men spend more time in paid jobs and women in unpaid duties. In general, the 
total amount of time spent in paid and unpaid work is similar for men and women (the so called  “iso-work”). Only in 
Italy women work on average 75 minutes more per day, mainly because of household unpaid duties.  
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Finally, in Italy the first three years after childbirth are crucial, because new mothers 
not re–entering the labour market in that period are at risk of definitive exclusion. A major 
role is played by the number of places in public childcare, which is extremely limited for 
babies below three years, especially in Southern regions (Del Boca 2003; Del Boca and Vuri 
2007b)5. Moreover, private childcare is quite expensive, while public structures provide 
opening hours, attracting mostly to non-working, or part-time working mothers. Therefore, 
in Italy the main safety net for mothers remains the family, not social services. The presence 
of elderly relatives in the household may play a double role in explaining women’s work 
patterns: they can provide household services such as child–care and domestic help, but they 
may also require unpaid help, discouraging the work participation of women (Marenzi and 
Pagani 2003). Finally, the overall effectiveness of Italian fiscal policies in favour of 
households was recently called into question (Saraceno 2007), because these are mostly 
based on the cost of housing and because of distortionary effects due to the individual 
taxation framework.6  
3.  The 2002 Italian Birth Sample Survey data 
Italian research into childcare, fertility and female employment faces several 
information gaps. The ISTAT Multiscopo survey provides a lot of information on the use of 
childcare services, but not on family income and wages. The ISTAT Labour Force Survey is 
very accurate with respect to women’s working status, but provides no information on 
household income or wealth. The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) is the most complete micro-survey on the income and wealth of Italian households, 
but does not collect information about childcare on a regular basis. Some researches combine 
two different datasets: a) matching the ISTAT Multiscopo with individual income data from 
SHIW (Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri 2005; Del Boca and Vuri 2007a); b) matching the 
                                                 
5 In 2007 the Government presented a major new plan (335 million euros for 2007-2010) to boost childcare services, 
especially for babies under three. This was the first big intervention after the 1971 law; Del Boca 2008. 
6  See Boeri and Del Boca (2007) for a discussion on the effectiveness of fiscal rebates for childcare expenditure and 
education expenditure in Italy, similar to the 2003 UK policies; for alternative fiscal measures see Alesina and Ichino 
(2007) and De Vincenti and Pollastri (2006).   
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ISTAT Labour Force Survey with individual income data from SHIW, especially to 
investigate the timing of births and their postponement (Rondinelli et al. 2006 and 2007).  
Our analysis uses data from the Italian Birth Sample Survey (IBSS), conducted for the 
first time in 2002 by the Italian National Statistics Office (ISTAT).7 The whole sample 
consists of 50,408 births registered between the second half of 2000 and the first half of 
2001, around 10 per cent of the total births in that period. Mothers were interviewed about 
18-21 months after delivery using the CATI technique. The questionnaire was designed to 
collect the main socio-demographic data on the new-born, the delivery and the parents 
(“short” form). The results presented in the next sections are based on one-third of the 
sample – about 16,700  mothers – interviewed using a “long” form, which contained 
additional sections about mothers’ working conditions before and after childbirth, the 
household composition, formal and informal childcare networks and the division of 
household chores. Some descriptive statistics follow: 
Employment before childbirth – Around 60 per cent of the IBSS new mothers were 
employed before childbirth, when they discovered they were pregnant (tables A2, A3 in the 
appendix). This percentage is about 9 points higher than the one referred to all women 
interviewed in the 2001 Labour Force Survey (LFS). In the LFS, the female employment rate 
was about 47 per cent for women between 15 and 49 years and 51 per cent for those between 
20 and 40.8 The share of mothers working before childbirth was about 75 per cent in the 
Northern regions, 65 per cent in the Centre and 38 and 43 per cent in the South and Islands 
respectively. Those percentages far exceed the corresponding ones referred to all women in 
the 2001 LFS.9 Moreover, according to the IBSS survey, a higher share of women worked in 
the public sector (17 per cent as against 14 per cent in the 2001 LFS). 
All the above-mentioned differences suggest that a selection process is probably at 
work, due to the correlation between fertility decisions and the current job status of women. 
                                                 
7 The Survey structure and main results are described in Istat (2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) and in CNEL (2003). 
8 A significant difference between the two statistics remains, even imposing on LFS data the same age structure of the 
IBSS.  
9 In particular the share of employed mothers in the IBSS is about 6 percentage points  above the LFS one in the Northern 
regions; 10 percentage points in the Centre and more than 12 percentage points in the South and Islands.  
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In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that women with a higher degree of job instability 
prefer to postpone the event of having a baby. In our estimates we will try to control for such 
a selection process (see the following section). 
Changes in working status – About 47 per cent of the IBSS new mothers were 
employed both before and after childbearing, showing a strong attachment to their job. At 
the opposite end of the scale, 37 per cent of new mothers were not employed: however, 16 
per cent had never worked before, but 21 per cent had had at least one previous working 
experience. The remaining 16 per cent of new mothers changed their working status: 4 per 
cent started working after delivery while 12 per cent lost their job in the period around the 
time of childbirth.   
The IBSS drop-out percentage for new mothers far exceeds the one for all women: 
according to the Labour Force Survey10, in the period 2001-2002, only about 6 per cent of 
working women between 20 and 40 shifted to a non-employment status, while in the IBSS 
about 20 per cent of mothers working at the beginning of their pregnancy, stopped working 
afterwards. In both surveys, drop-out transitions increase for women in temporary 
employment or with no contract and for part-time workers (table A4 in the appendix).  
In general, the balance resulting from flows of women entering the labour market and 
flows of women leaving it after childbirth is negative. A positive contribution is provided by 
part-time contracts: about 27 per cent of full-time mothers shifted to part-time, boosting the 
share of voluntary part-time from about 6 per cent to about 30 per cent. Part-time contracts 
probably represent the most attractive alternative to leaving one’s job. The opposite 
transition from part-time to full-time employment after childbirth only happens in less than 1 
per cent of cases. 
Childcare – Among mothers still working after childbirth, the reconciliation of work 
and family mainly relies on the help of grandparents. In 55 per cent of households, the 
elderly provide vital support in caring for children. Many families prefer to trust their own 
relatives for assurance reasons; moreover, the role played by relatives is particularly 
                                                 
10 In the LFS, the transitions are only available at a one year distance.  
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important for its characteristics of low cost associated with high flexibility, features that are 
not always available in childcare services.  
About 20 per cent of mothers utilize childcare services (both public and privately run) 
and only 10 per cent use babysitters. Some 12 per cent of new mothers are unable to use 
childcare. The main reason they give (47 per cent of cases) is the lack of available places and 
limited hours. This is especially true for mothers in the South and Islands. The fairly limited 
use of private childcare facilities is principally due to the high cost (20 per cent of cases). 
These costs are particularly high for mothers living in the North.  
4.  Controlling for selection into motherhood  
When studying the new mothers’ employment patterns with the IBSS data, the main 
problem to deal with is the potential “selection into motherhood bias” due to the correlation 
between fertility and employment decisions. In the IBSS, the employment patterns are 
observed only for mothers. The unavailability of a control group of women without children 
could result in biased estimates, if we do not control for the selection process underlying 
fertility decisions.11  
A test for selection into motherhood is performed using the Heckman approach 
(Heckman 1979). For the sake of simplicity, only the results of the tests are reported.  
Since the IBSS does not contain information about women without children, a sample 
of women has been selected from the Bank of Italy SHIW survey. A post-stratification of 
weights is then performed according to the distributions of the group’s age, level of 
education and geographical area of residence using census data. This technique makes the 
                                                 
11 In the IBSS data, the sample selection problem could heavily bias the estimates of the new mothers’ probability to work 
18-21 months after the childbirth. Let’s consider, for example, a very extreme situation in which women’s working 
conditions are either fully protected (as in the public sector) or not protected at all (as in the case of a fixed-term contract in 
a very small private firm). If the degree of protection were the only determinant of having children –total sample selection– 
only women benefiting from a high degree of job protection would have a significant probability of having a child. As a 
consequence, the sample would be mainly composed of mothers working in protected sectors and most of them would 
retain their job after childbirth. Ignoring such a selection process would probably lead to erroneous conclusions (for 
example, according to the data, the employment protection legislation would barely affect new mothers’ employment 
patterns).   
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selected sample of women representative of the whole population and, therefore, comparable 
with the IBSS survey.  
In the selection equation the probability of having a child (0-3 years old) is estimated 
given a set of mothers’ characteristics: age, level of education, geographical area, size of 
town and distance (in hours) from relatives. The “excluded instrument” is the number of 
mother’s siblings which is assumed to be a proxy of mother’s preference for children. After 
controlling for the mentioned covariates, the hypothesis of no selection cannot be rejected at 
a significant level of  0.78 (table A5 in the appendix).12  
The correlation between fertility decisions and employment patterns might also result 
in the endogeneity of the decision of whether or not to have more than one child. For 
instance, working mothers with one child may decide not to have another child in order to 
reconcile work and family more easily (they may also have an unobserved low propensity 
towards large households). Accordingly, if only mothers who have been able to organize 
their life by reconciling work and family decide to have a second child, in the sample we 
would observe a positive association between employment probability and the presence of a 
higher order birth. 
In IBSS data this hypothesis is tested, using a bivariate probit model. We jointly model 
the probability of having more than one child and the employment probability. In the first 
equation, the “excluded instrumental variable” used is the number of pregnancies the mother 
had in order to have the last child (including abortions and miscarriages). This variable is a 
proxy of women’s difficulties in having a child and is strictly related to the decision to have 
more than one child. It can be assumed to be unrelated to employment decisions. More than 
one test is performed using different response variables (more/less than one child, more/less 
than two, more/less than three) and they show that also the hypothesis of no endogeneity 
cannot be rejected (table A6 in the appendix).  
                                                 
12 A similar result is presented in Bratti, Del Bono and Vuri (2005). In order to test for selection into motherhood, the 
authors estimate a probit model with sample selection, where the selection equation is represented by the decision of having 
a first child and the main equation is represented by the employment equation. In none of the specifications of their model 
did they find a significant correlation between the error terms of the employment and fertility equations.  
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5.  Mothers’ probability of not working 18-21 months after delivery 
In this section we analyse the factors influencing the new mothers’ risk of not working 
18-21 months after delivery. In the IBSS, the time length of 18-21 months after childbirth is 
the only available period for studying mothers’ employment patterns. However, this period is 
also the most informative, in view of Italian maternity leave legislation – which covers at 
most 12 months after delivery – and considering the results of previous studies about 
women’s career interruptions.13 
The model used is the following bivariate probit: 
{}
{} 0 ε X 1 Y
0 ε X 1 Y
2i 2 2 2i 2i
1i 1 1i 1i




i Z  
where the error terms have a bivariate normal distribution with a correlation coefficient 
ρ ≠ 0. 
In the first equation the dependent variable Y1i is a dummy variable indicating whether 
the woman is inactive/unemployed or not. 14 Previous studies show that the work attachment 
of unemployed and inactive persons is similar in Italy, especially in the Southern regions 
(Viviano 2002). We therefore combine the two categories, also because of the small number 
of unemployed new mothers in the sample. 
The first equation explanatory variables are: mother’s individual characteristics, 
including age, nationality and level of education; spouse/live-in partner characteristics (his 
employment position and level of education); composition of the household, including the 
presence of grandparents; mother’s working status and attainment before childbirth, such as 
                                                 
13As documented in Solera (2003), Italian women are unlikely to experience a career break more than once in their lives, 
and this usually occurs in correspondence with the birth of the first child. Moreover, Bratti et al. (2005) analysing the new 
mothers’ employment decisions during the 3-year period following the birth of the first child, found that the probabilities of 
employment are very similar in each year of observation. 
14It is worth noting that unlike in the LFS, in the IBSS survey no definition of unemployment is provided to the respondent 
during the interview. In the Labour Force Survey the definition of unemployment given to the respondent consists in people 
actively looking for a job in the preceding 60 days and genuinely wishing to start working immediately. This measure could 
be therefore quite different from the IBSS one.  
12 
job position and type of contract (part-time/ full-time, permanent/fixed-term)15;  social 
services indicators (the share of available places in nursery schools for children under 3 on a 
regional basis, Istat 2003). 
In the second equation the response variable is a dummy indicating whether the child 
attends a nursery school or not. The reason for the inclusion of this equation is that it enables 
us to take into account the simultaneity of mother’s decisions.16 The covariates are the same 
as those included in the first equation plus two variables indicating that, according to those 
interviewed, socialization and educational methods play a key role in children’s 
development.17 The results show that there is a strong negative correlation between the use 
of a nursery school and the probability of not working (ρ= –0.55). 
The unconditional average probability of not working after delivery is about 49 per 
cent. As expected, older mothers are more likely to return to work (see Table 1). By contrast, 
mothers under 24 face greater difficulties: their average probability of not working is about 
72 per cent (23 points above average). 
The level of education plays an important role too. The higher it is, the lower the 
probability of not working: on average, a mother with a university degree is about 43 
percentage point more likely to work than a mother with compulsory education. 
The risk of not working after childbirth is slightly higher for mothers who already have 
a child under three. This result may reflect the fact that mothers with the youngest over three 
are likely to have organized a network that enables them to keep working. Therefore the 
arrival of a new baby has a lower impact on their employment patterns. 
The most important effect is due to the mother’s employment status before childbirth. 
An inherited non-working status is very persistent, almost completely persistent for 
                                                 
15 Initially we also included regional dummy variables and labour market indicators (women’s activity and unemployment 
rates by age) but their effect was captured by women’s employment status during pregnancy. Accordingly, those variables 
are not included in the final specification of the model. 
16 It is important to note that this variable could not be included among the covariates of the first equation since it is 
endogenous. As a matter of fact the probability of schooling the child depends, among other things, on whether the mother 
is working, on the household total income and on nationality. We also tested for the absence of endogeneity of this variable 
and the results showed that this hypothesis must be rejected. 
17 Those two variables are included for identification purposes. Under the assumption that errors follow a bivariate normal 
distribution, the estimates are consistent. Moreover, tests we have done do not give us conclusive evidence of whether we 
can consider the two variables as “excluded instruments” or not, suggesting caution in any causal interpretation.   
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housewives and students without any previous working experience. Compared to these 
mothers, the chance of finding a new job significantly increases for women with some prior 
working experience.  
At the opposite end of the scale, mothers who are managers or entrepreneurs and 
mothers benefiting from the employment protection provided by the public sector show a 
high attachment to their profession. A possible explanation lies in the high implicit costs 
they would have to face if they had to leave their job. Moreover, in the public sector, 
mothers are more likely to have part-time jobs and shorter daily working hours, making it 
easier for them to reconcile work and family life. 
The importance of employment protection is also confirmed by coefficients measuring 
the effects of different kinds of job contract. Working mothers with previous temporary 
contracts have a significantly higher probability of not working after childbirth compared to 
mothers with a permanent position. 
The family network also has a major influence. The presence of grandparents increases 
the probability of working by about 25 points. Of course, the presence of elderly relatives 
could imply that women have to devote time to caring for co-residing and/or non-residing 
elderly relatives. Although such an effect cannot be estimated, the results show that the 
positive effect outweighs the negative one due to the need to care for the elderly (this is 
consistent with previous research, see Marenzi and Pagani 2003). 
Finally, the availability of childcare services is also associated with the employment 
probability. In regions where the proportion of young children (0–2) using crèches is higher 
than 12 per cent, the new mothers’ probability of being employed doubles with respect to 
those where less than 10 per cent of 0–2 children use childcare.   
14 
 
Table 1. Probability of not working 18-21 months after childbirth 
Variable   Marginal probability of 
a  
 Not  working  Using  crèches 
Mother’s age    
<= 24 ........................................................... 72.0 5.5 
25 – 29 ......................................................... 51.9 9.2 
30 –34 .......................................................... 43.8 12.6 
35 – 39.......................................................... 40.7 15.9 
40+............................................................... 41.6 16.7 
Mother’s education     
Compulsory or informal schooling .............. 67.9 6.2 
High school ................................................. 43.6 12.3 
University degree......................................... 24.5 20.5 
Mother’s nationality (foreign) ................... 65.2 12.0 
Children before current pregnancy    
None............................................................. 55.7 10.1 
Youngest child 0-2 years old ....................... 59.1 11.4 
Youngest child 3-5 years old ....................... 55.0 11.0 
Youngest child over 6  ................................. 55.9 9.2 
Mother’s previous employment status   
Housewife without working experience ...... 99.4 1.0 
Housewife with working experience ........... 90.2 2.4 
Student without working experience ........... 99.8 2.1 
Student with working experience ................ 63.6 10.6 
Employed in the private sector   
Manager, middle-management..................... 12.9 26.3 
Office worker, school teacher ...................... 18.4 19.6 
Factory  worker............................................ 37.6 12.2 
Entrepreneur ................................................ 11.9 19.9 
Member of arts or professions ..................... 8.2 21.1 
Sole proprietor and other self-employed...... 20.6 12.6 
Employed in the public sector .................. 9.7 19.4 
Mother’s type of contract   
Permanent status, working full-time............. 37.1 12.7 
Permanent status working part-time............. 40.2 12.0 
Fixed-term contract working full-time  ....... 51.9 10.9 
Fixed-term contract working part-time  ....... 59.6 7.4 
Partner’s working status    
Not employed/single mother........................ 58.8 9.0 
Office worker............................................... 49.8 10.5 
Manager, middle-management..................... 34.8 20.1 
Entrepreneur, self-employed........................ 49.9 11.4 
Partner’s level of education    
High school ................................................. 43.1 13.0 
University degree......................................... 31.6 20.1 
Presence of grandparents .......................... 24.7 4.4 
Child-care system
b    
Less than 10 per cent.................................... 59.4 8.5 
10 - 12 per cent............................................. 35.5 14.3 
More than 12 per cent .................................. 29.1 21.8 
Total ............................................................ 49.2 11.4 
aBoth mothers who use nursery schools and those who do not are included. 






6.  The determinants of voluntary transition to non-employment after childbirth 
In this section we focus on mothers who are employed at the beginning of pregnancy 
and analyse the determinants of voluntary withdrawal from labour market after delivery. The 
sub-sample consists of about 9,800 units. 
As in the previous section, we take into account the simultaneity of mother’s decisions  
using a bivariate probit . 
In the first equation the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the mother 
declared to have voluntarily left her job (and to not be working at the interview time). In the 
sample those women represent 14 per cent of cases. The decision to leave is mainly 
motivated by “the need to spend more time with children” (60 per cent) or by the 
“difficulties in reconciling work and family life” (20 per cent). This variable is therefore a 
good proxy for the mother’s decision to leave work to take care of her family in the event 
that no reconciliation is possible. 
As in the previous section, the second equation includes two variables indicating that, 
according to those interviewed, socialization and educational methods play a key role in 
children’s growth. 
As expected, the availability of a nursery school is negatively related to the probability 
of voluntary exit ( ρ=-0.65). 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis. As to the employment status, 
employees and in particular factory workers show a higher propensity towards leaving their 
job than entrepreneurs and members of art and professions.  
The degree of job stability and protection confirms its importance in helping mothers 
into paid employment. For mothers working in the public sector the average exit probability 
is 5 per cent (about one third of the overall mean). By contrast, in the trade and services 
sector this probability increases to 18 per cent. A stronger effect is produced by fixed-term  
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contracts that increase the exit probability to 46 per cent when the mother is also working 
part-time.18  
Among demographic characteristics, age and level of education show the strongest 
influence. For working mothers under 24 the probability of leaving their job is 26 per cent 
(twice the average).   
The level of education confirms its influence not only for entering the labour market, 
but also for deciding not to leave it after childbirth. For mothers with a university degree this 
risk decreases by about 16 per cent compared with mothers with the lowest level of 
education. As in the previous analysis, the probability of withdrawing is - on average - 
higher for mothers with a previous child under three. 
The partner’s working status has a significant influence on mothers’ decisions. When 
the partner is an entrepreneur or self-employed the probability of voluntarily leaving 
increases to about 46 per cent.  
The presence of grandparents who can take care of the child significantly prevents 
mothers’ withdrawal: the exit probability decreases by about a half.  
Moreover, the probability of leaving the labour market decreases in areas with a better 
supply of childcare services. In regions with a low availability of childcare places (less than 
10 per cent) the probability of voluntary exit is about 16 per cent (two points above the 
overall average). This percentage drops to about 9 per cent in areas with a higher supply of 
public childcare services. 
  
                                                 
18 By contrast, fixed-term contracts don’t seem to have an appreciable impact. This is not surprising because of the 
dependent variable. In the analysis, if the contract expires and it is not renewed, it is not classified as resignation.  
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Table 2. Probability of voluntarily leaving employment after childbirth 
Variable Marginal probability of 
a  
 Not  working Using crèches 
Mother’s age    
<= 24  ........................................................ 26.0 11.2 
25 – 29 ...................................................... 15.3 14.4 
30 –34 ....................................................... 12.4 17.4 
35 – 39....................................................... 10.5 23.2 
40 +............................................................ 9.3 25.4 
Mother’s level of education   
Compulsory or informal schooling ........... 23.3 12.6 
High school ............................................... 12.0 17.6 
University degree....................................... 6.7 23.3 
Mother’s  nationality  (foreign) .............. 23.5 18.6 
Mother expecting a new baby................. 14.6 18.6 
Children before pregnancy       
None.......................................................... 14.5 17.0 
Youngest child 0-2 years old .................... 16.3 16.8 
Youngest child 3-5 years old .................... 12.7 19.4 
Youngest child over 6 ............................... 12.7 17.3 
Employed in the private sector   
Manager, middle-management.................. 9.3 26.3 
Office worker, school teacher ................... 12.9 19.9 
Factory  worker.......................................... 28.1 12.0 
Entrepreneur ............................................. 1.1 19.8 
Member of arts or professions .................. 4.4 21.0 
Sole proprietor and other self-employed.... 12.1 12.8 
Employed in services/ commerce sector.... 18.2 17.1 
Employed in the public sector ................ 4.7 19.7 
Mother’s type of contract   
Permanent status, working full-time.......... 11.8 18.7 
Permanent status working part-time.......... 15.4 13.1 
Fixed-term contract working full-time  ..... 33.0 11.3 
Fixed-term contract working part-time  .... 46.4 8.0 
Partner’s working status   
Not employed/single mother...................... 13.6 16.5 
Office worker ............................................ 13.4 16.7 
Manager, middle-management.................. 9.5 24.3 
Entrepreneur, self-employed...................... 16.0 17.1 
Partner’s level of education   
High school ............................................... 11.9 18.4 
University degree....................................... 8.2 24.5 
Presence of grandparents........................ 5.9 4.7 
Childcare system
b    
Less than 10 per cent................................. 15.7 15.9 
10 -1 2  per cent.......................................... 12.6 17.4 
More than 12 per cent................................ 9.5 26.2 
Total.......................................................... 13.8 17.5 
aBoth mothers who use nursery schools and those who do not are included. 
bProportion of young children (0-2) using public childcare. 
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7.  Concluding remarks  
Among European countries, Italy stands out for combining one of the lowest female 
employment rates with one of the highest long-term unemployment rates. Even the 
remarkable increase in female participation experienced since 1995 has been insufficient to 
close the gap with other European countries, especially in the Southern regions. In this paper 
we focused on the employment patterns of Italian mothers after childbirth.  
In the two-year period surrounding childbirth, 20 per cent of women working before 
pregnancy leave the labour market, while only 4 per cent start working after delivery. Most 
of the drop-out probability – about 70 per cent – is due to voluntary departure, while one 
fourth is attributable to temporary jobs or a firm’s bankruptcy.  
Both the risk of not working and of voluntary leave after childbirth vary according to a 
similar set of characteristics. The care-giving role played by grandparents is probably one of 
the key factors that increases the probability of a mother remaining in the labour market. A 
second important factor is the availability of public care facilities. 
Human capital variables have a significant influence on maintaining mothers in paid 
employment. As the education and the job attainment levels increase, the unemployment and 
voluntary exit probabilities decline, because of the high (implicit) costs highly-educated and 
well-paid mothers face if they leave their job.  
A mother’s age also plays an important role. In particular, mothers under 24 face the 
greatest difficulties in reconciling work and family. Their average probability of not working 
is about 70 per cent (the average is 49 per cent) and the probability of voluntarily leaving 
their job is about 25 per cent (twice the average); the latter probability jumps to 53 per cent 
for those who are not entitled to any help from family or public services.  
The probability of keeping a job also grows with the degree of job protection. When 
mothers work in the public sector, the probability of not working after delivery decreases by 
about 25 per cent. At the opposite end of the scale, for mothers with fixed-term jobs, the 
probability increases by 23 per cent.  
Overall, part-time contracts do have a positive net effect on the employment rate. 
Nevertheless, some points are worth noting.  On the one hand, part-time contracts may  
19 
represent an important alternative to unemployment. In the sample, about 17 per cent of 
women switched from full-time to part-time work in order to reconcile family and work. On 
the other hand, for mothers working part-time during pregnancy the probabilities of 
unemployment and of voluntary exit increase significantly. A possible explanation is that the 
previous choice of a part-time job may also be an indicator of lower labour market 
attachment. Moreover, in most cases the low attractiveness of such jobs in terms of 
remuneration, working hours and self-fulfilment may convince mothers that being employed 
is not worthwhile.  
Finally, from a policy point of view, it is worth nothing that the supply of childcare 
services is strongly associated with both the probabilities of entering and staying in the 
labour market.  20 
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Appendix A: Statistical tables and figures 
 






































Source : OECD, Society at a Glance, 2006. Social Indicators, SS3.3. 
Notes: (1) the employment rates are for  women with a child, aged 15-64. It is worth noting that 
there are very few mothers with children under 14 years in the following groups: under 19 years; 55-
64 years. For a better comparison, the employment rates for childless women refer to females in the 





Households by social and demographic characteristics  
 (percentages) 
Variables Percentages  Variables Percentages 
Mother’s characteristics    Husband/Partner’ s characteristics
(*)   
Age   Age   
14 – 24 ............................................ 13.0  14 – 24............................................... 4.1 
25 – 29  ........................................... 30.1  25 – 29 .............................................. 16.9 
30 –34  ............................................ 35.9  30 –34 ............................................... 36.9 
35 – 39 ............................................ 17.9  35 – 39............................................... 28.5 
40 – 49 ............................................ 3.2  Over 40  ............................................. 13.5 
Age at first child    Education   
Up to 19........................................... 4.4  Compulsory or informal schooling...... 44.9 
20 – 24  ........................................... 21.9  High school  ....................................... 43.2 
25 – 29  ........................................... 39.1  University degree............................... 11.8 
30 – 34 ............................................ 26.5     
35 – 49 ............................................ 8.1     
Nationality    Occupation status after childbirth   
Italian............................................... 89.5 Employee  -  Low ................................. 58.2 
Foreign  ........................................... 10.5  Employee – High................................ 7.3 
Residential status   Self-employed.................................... 30.2 
Single .............................................. 2.0 Not  working........................................ 4.0 
Married ........................................... 90.9     
Cohabiting ....................................... 7.1  Town size    
Number of children    up to 20,000 inhabitants .................... 47.8 
One.................................................. 51.1  from 20,000 to 40,000........................ 13.8 
Two.................................................. 37.6  from 40,000 to 500,000...................... 27.5 
Three or more.................................. 11.3  more than 500,000............................. 10.5 
Education    Geographical area   
Compulsory or informal schooling... 34.9  North  ................................................. 41.2 
High school ..................................... 50.3  Centre  ............................................... 17.2 
University degree ............................ 14.8  South and Islands .............................. 41.4 
Occupation status after childbirth      
Employee – Low.............................. 38.7     
Employee – High............................. 3.0     
Self-employed ................................. 9.0    
Not working ..................................... 49.2     
      
       
(*) Cases of single mothers are excluded 








(*) by  geographical area 
(percentages) 
Mothers’ status  Variables  
Employed Unemployed  Inactive 
  IBSS (before childbirth) 
Geographical area     
North East ....................................................................... 75.2  2.1  22.7 
North West ...................................................................... 74.9  2.2  22.9 
Centre.............................................................................. 65.5 3.6 30.9 
South............................................................................... 38.2 4.8 57.0 
Islands............................................................................. 43.1 4.7 52.2 
Italy.................................................................................. 58.8 3.5 37.8 
  IBSS (after childbirth) 
Geographical area     
North East ....................................................................... 65.2  3.2  31.6 
North West ...................................................................... 65.5  2.9  31.6 
Centre.............................................................................. 58.0 4.4 37.6 
South............................................................................... 31.9 6.3 61.8 
Islands............................................................................. 36.6 5.4 58.0 
Italy.................................................................................. 51.0 4.5 44.5 
  LFS (women 20-40) 
Geographical area     
North East ....................................................................... 67.5  5.1  27.4 
North West ...................................................................... 70.2  4.5  25.3 
Centre.............................................................................. 55.0 9.1 35.9 
South............................................................................... 27.8 16.2 56.0 
Islands............................................................................. 27.8 17.8 54.4 
Italy.................................................................................. 50.8 10.1 39.1 
      








Mothers’ working status before and after childbirth compared to women’s working status 
(percentages) 





  …before childbirth  …after childbirth   
Employment status      
Employed...................................................... 58.8 51.0  50.8 
Unemployed ................................................. 3.5 4.5  10.1 
Not in labour force........................................ 37.8  44.5  39.1 
Branch of activity      
Agriculture ................................................... 1.6  1.3  1.6 
Industry......................................................... 11.9 9.2  11.5 
Trade and commerce ................................... 14.7  12.0  11.8 
Services........................................................ 13.4 11.2  12.8 
Public administration .................................... 17.1  17.1  13.1 
Not employed  .............................................. 41.2  49.1  49.2 
Work status      
Employee      
Cadre or manager ........................................ 3.0  3.0  2.0 
Office worker ................................................ 30.0  27.3  23.8 
Other............................................................. 16.4 11.5  15.7 
Total ................................................................... 49.4  41.8  41.5 
Self-employed      
sole proprietor, member of arts or 
professions..........................................................
3.7 3.9  2.5 
Other self-employed .................................... 5.6  5.2  6.8 
Total ................................................................... 9.3  9.1  9.3 
Not employed       
Housewife .................................................... 35.3  43.2  24.8 
Other ............................................................ 6.0  6.0  24.4 
Total ................................................................... 41.3  49.1  49.2 
Type of work       
Full-time........................................................ 91.4 66.9  81.8 
Involuntary part-time..................................... 2.6  4.1  6.2 
Voluntary part-time....................................... 6.0  29.0  12.0 
      
Permanent status ......................................... 83.2  85.4  85.3 
Fixed-term contract  ..................................... 11.6  11.5 




(*) women between 20 – 40.  (**) the figure includes both fixed-term contracts and employment without a contract.  






Mothers’ working condition  before and after childbirth, 2000-2001 
…Total 
(row percentages) 




                           Before childbirth                           
IBSS 
After childbirth 
Employed ............................................................ 79.9   3.1  17.0  100.0 
Unemployed........................................................ 31.3 40.7  28.0  100.0 
Not in labour force............................................... 7.3  3.5  89.2  100.0 
Total .................................................................... 50.8 4.5  44.6  100.0 
  LFS
(*) 
Employed ............................................................ 94.1 1.6  4.3  100.0 
Unemployed........................................................ 20.3 53.9  25.8  100.0 
Not in labour force............................................... 3.5  2.7  93.8  100.0 
Total .................................................................... 44.0 4.5  51.5  100.0 
        
 
…By working time 
(row percentages) 




                           Before childbirth                           
IBSS 
After childbirth 
Full-time........................................................... 57.7 26.8  2.4  13.1 100.0 
Part-time.......................................................... 13.3 18.2  10.2  58.3 100.0 
  LFS
(*) 
Full-time........................................................... 92.8 2.2  1.3  3.7 100.0 
Part-time.......................................................... 5.4 4.8  6.6  83.2  100.0 
          
 
…By type of contract 
(row percentages) 
 Permanent Temporary 
 




                         Before childbirth            
IBSS 
After childbirth 
Permanent............................................ 83.0 1.4  1.8  13.5  100.0 
Temporary............................................ 6.7 49.7  9.0  34.7  100.0 
  LFS
(*) 
Permanent............................................ 89.2 6.7  1.1  3.0  100.0 
Temporary............................................ 20.6 2.6  5.9  7.9  100.0 
          
 






Test for selection into motherhood 
(bivariate probit with selection) 
 
  Selection equation  Structural equation 
  Dep. variable: Probability of 
having a child (0-3 year old) 
Dep. Variable:  
Probabilty of unemployment 
 Parameter  Robust   
Std. Error 
Parameter Robust   
Std. Error 
Variable        
Age ................................................................................................. 0.494*** 0.059  0.123  0.554 
Age squared................................................................................... -0.008*** 0.001  -0.003  0.009 
Education (reference: none or elementary school)        
Middle or high school................................................................... 0.119* 0.061  -0.893***  0.226 
University degree ........................................................................ -0.024 0.107  -1.157***  0.320 
Nationality (reference: Italian)        
Foreign .................................................................................... 0.114 0.098  0.341***  3.100 
Town size (reference: up to 20,000 inhabitants)        
from 20,000 to 40,000 .............................................................. -0.163* 0.087  0.299  0.300 
from 40,000 to 500,000............................................................. -0.174** 0.068  0.265  0.261 
more than 500,000.................................................................... -0.435*** 0.099  0.718  0.576 
Geographical area (reference: North)        
Centre...........................................  -0.151* 0.083  0.238  0.293 
South and Islands........................  0.058 0.063  1.010***  0.239 
Distance from relatives (reference: less than one hour)        
1-2 hours ................................................................................. -0.224* 0.142  -0.008 0.449 
More than 2 hour..................................................................... -0.320*** 0.081  0.345 0.398 
Number of siblings........................................................................ 0.05* 0.028  -  - 
Intercept.............................................. ............................................. -7.591*** 0.981  -1.450  9.463 
Lambda................................................ ............................................. - -  0.352  1.282 
No. of observation    2909    450 
Pseudo R-square    0.15    0.23 
Source: 2002 SHIW.  





Test for endogeneity of second (or higher) order of birth  
(bivariate probit) 
 
  Reduced form equation  Structural  equation 
  Dep. Variable: Probability of 
having more than three 
children  
Dep. Variable:  
Probabilty of unemployment 
 Parameter  Robust   
Std. Error 
Parameter Robust   
Std. Error 
Variable        
Age..................................................................................................  0.313*** 0.032  -0.135*** 0.041 
Age squared...................................................................................  -0.003*** 0.001  0.002*** 0.001 
Education (reference: none or elementary school)      
Middle or high school................................................................... -0.241*** 0.039  -0.553*** 0.055 
University degree......................................................................... -0.520*** 0.062  -1.020*** 0.089 
Nationality (reference: Italian)      
Foreign .....................................................................................  0.177*** 0.068  0.494*** 0.148 
Geographical area (reference: North East)      
North East.................................................................................. 0.071 0.052  0.203*** 0.081 
Centre.......................................................................................  0.128** 0.060  0.328*** 0.070 
South ........................................................................................ 0.272*** 0.073  0.434*** 0.105 
Islands ....................................................................................... 0.397v 0.074  0.383*** 0.109 
Past working experience (reference: none)      
With working experience...........................................................  -0.086*** 0.036  -9.329*** 0.146 
Partner’s working status (reference: Not employed/single mother)      
Office worker ............................................................................... 0.230*** 0.087  -0.056 0.120 
Cadre or manager........................................................................ 0.095 0.102 0.065 0.166 
Entrepreneur or Self-employed.................................................... 0.182** 0.091 0.047 0.122 
Education (reference: compulsory or not formal schooling)      
High school .........................................................................  -0.224*** 0.038  -0.127*** 0.048 
University degree.................................................................  -0.551*** 0.075  -0.207*** 0.094 
Principal residence by tenure (reference: not rented)      
Rented or sublet ........................................................................... -0.038 0.045 0.116 0.071 
Number of interrupted pregnancies (reference: one at 
maximum) 
    
Two......................................................................................  0.725*** 0.045  -  - 
More than two......................................................................  0.747*** 0.071  -  - 
Childcare       
Childcare system 
(**)  ..........................................................  -0.004 0.007  -0.035*** 0.011 
Presence of grandparents....................................................  -0.068** 0.033  -1.069*** 0.050 
Intercept............................................... ............................................. -7.296*** 0.512 4.107 0.640 
        
No. of observation        16417 
rho  0.048 0.034     
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  2.06752    Prob > chi2 = 0.1505 
Source: 2002 IBSS.  
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